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Abstract: The archaeology of time, in its current form, is problematic. Some recent 
studies have considered either the ‘event’ or the ‘structure’ as pivotal to experiencing 
temporality, yet this is at odds with those more detailed and theoretically-explicit 
accounts of time, developed within related disciplines, which consider both as 
intrinsic and inseparable parts of this experience. Other archaeological studies regard 
event and structure as nested within a hierarchical scheme of interpretation. But these 
examples of time perspectivism, which are largely inspired by Braudel and the 
Annales School, lack any overall conception of temporality and divorce time from the 
social context within which it acquires meaning. Rather, the complexity of time, 
including the crucial relationship between memory and anticipation, is only grasped 
by a genealogical approach whereby interpretation is problem-orientated. This is to 
focus on particular questions about the origin, reproduction and transformation of 
individual institutions, practices and material culture. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The archaeology of time, in its contemporary form, is largely dependent on a small if 
growing number of studies. Some have emphasised the multi-stranded nature of 
temporality and considered how its complexity can be best organised into manageable 
time-scales for the interpretation of the past (Bailey 1981, 1983, 1987, Gledhill & 
Rowlands 1982, Hodder 1987, Lewthwaite 1987, Bintliff 1991, 1999, 2004, Knapp 
1992). Other studies have asked more basic questions as to ‘time’s pervasiveness as 
an inescapable dimension of all aspects of social experience and practice’ (Munn 
1992: 93), offering insights into how it was understood by individual minds and 
collective mentalities (notable examples include Hodder 1990, Barrett 1994, Gosden 
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1994, Murray 1999, Karlsson 2001). These two approaches, when considered 
together, derive their inspiration from a wide range of sources in the humanities and 
social sciences; and as such, promote a more informed and explicit appreciation of 
temporality, shifting archaeology beyond its simple belief in time as a neutral 
chronological ‘container’ for the continuity or transformation of society. But despite 
this, these studies pay insufficient theoretical attention to the nature of time, 
commonly misunderstanding, or even ignoring, the way in which temporality was 
woven into the thinking and behaviour of past peoples. It is this which is of concern 
here. 
 
The difficulties with fully comprehending temporality can be illustrated by those 
archaeological accounts which embrace the long-standing anthropological belief that 
‘it is the rhythm of social life which is at the basis of the category of time’ (Durkheim 
1965: 488). In adopting this premise they employ what are actually differing 
definitions of temporality, and a striking contrast, or the ‘great divide’ referred to in 
the paper title, is evident between two of the most influential of these studies. The 
focus of interest within The Domestication of Europe by Ian Hodder (1990), on the 
one hand, is the long-term development of conceptual structures and social 
institutions. This account not only adopts a timescale which extends beyond the 
lifetime of individuals, but importantly, considers temporality as equivalent to the 
long-term development of a ‘world view’. It is the latter which apparently defines 
what happens at a smaller-scale within the social system. This invocation of a ‘time of 
the structure’ clearly contrasts with the archaeological project envisaged in Fragments 
from Antiquity by John Barrett (1994). Here it is the short-term engagement of 
individuals with their immediate material surroundings and social relations which are 
considered as the key to interpreting the past. The implication of this approach is that 
long-term structures can not be grasped in their entirety, and that the temporality of 
‘routine social practices, maintained within given social conditions’ (Barrett 1994: 
28), or the ‘time of the event’, determines the existence of a social system, including 
those larger-scale entities and processes. These two publications, therefore, summon a 
categorical distinction between the ‘time of the event’ and the ‘time of the structure’ 
by effectively advocating that past society can only be meaningfully studied at one of 
these temporal scales. 
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But by assuming the priority of either the ‘time of the event’ or the ‘time of the 
structure’ they contrast with those more detailed and theoretically-explicit accounts of 
temporality, developed within related disciplines, which regard the two temporal 
scales as completely dependent upon each other (examples would include Sahlins 
1985, Gell 1992, Munn 1992). It is this failure to grasp the complex inter-relationship 
of ‘event’ and ‘structure’ which is the starting-point of this paper. It will be suggested 
that both concepts are actually an intrinsic and inseparable part of social discourse. 
Attention will then turn to those archaeological accounts which consider event and 
structure as nested within a single interpretive scheme, with each of these time-scales 
signifying different processes and relationships. It will be argued that these examples 
of time perspectivism — which are largely inspired by the French Annaliste historian 
Fernand Braudel — not only lack an overall conception of temporality, but also 
divorce time from the very social context within which it acquires meaning. An 
alternative framework, which is at least partly dependent on the ‘history from below’ 
of Le Roy Ladurie and other third generation Annaliste scholars, is proposed. It is 
suggested that event and structure can only be conjoined within a genealogical 
approach, whereby interpretation is problem-orientated, focusing on particular 
questions about the origin, reproduction and transformation of individual institutions, 
practices and material culture. 
 
 
THE TEMPORALITY OF EVENT AND STRUCTURE 
Essential to temporality is the complete interdependence of event and structure within 
any interpretive reality (Giddens 1984: 139-44, Sahlins 1985: vii-xviii, Shanks & 
Tilley 1987: 127-8, 135, Johnson 1989: 207-8). This is not to contend that the lifetime 
of an individual is somehow equivalent to the duration of specific social institutions 
and symbolic schema, but to consider an event, or what is a specific moment of 
human agency, as the actualisation of a structural pattern situated within a diachronic 
flow of time. In this sense, it is the ‘time of the structure’ which provides these 
happenings with the historical preunderstandings by which they achieve their efficacy 
and meaning. Without this context the single event means nothing in terms of the 
world. But at the same time, all structures are eventful in their constitution. Put 
simply, the meaning of any specific cultural scheme is only generated by embodied 
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practice, or within the ‘time of the event’, and it is for this reason that individuals or 
groups possess the ability to intervene and ‘make a difference’ in the development of 
long-term traditions. Therefore, to advocate the primacy of either the ‘time of the 
event’ or the ‘time of the structure’ is actually to under-theorise what is, in reality, a 
recursive and complex network of relationships. And to do so is to invoke either a 
reductionist or determinist understanding of social process.   
 
The interplay of event and structure is aptly illustrated by anthropological accounts of 
preliterate non-Western ritual (notable examples include Leach 1961, Durkheim 1965, 
Lévi-Strauss 1966, Bloch 1977). These narratives discuss the importance of recreating 
a ‘mythical time’, the product of repeatedly punctuating existence with ceremonial 
acts or rites of passage which emphasise long-term continuity and stability. These 
events accordingly enliven, bring into existence, or even transform, key structuring 
principles including those ‘collective representations which strikingly contradict 
ordinary, everyday notions about the world — representations, for instance, which 
imply that time goes round and round rather than on and on, or that time is wholly 
immobilized, past, present and future are identical, and nothing can ever change’ (Gell 
1992: 79). When these rites are repeatedly strung together, the idealised concepts of 
society, particularly those that invoke ancestry and genealogy, become purposeful 
entities with the power to determine the long-term development of communities. 
Hence, the past is not only swallowed up in the present-day ‘sameness’ of these 
events but also projected forward to create the contemporary values which orientate 
future social activity. But these world-restoring events ‘are not just there and 
happen…..but have a meaning and happen because of that meaning’ (Sahlins 1985: 
153). Structural principles assume a logic, or what can be better described as a moral 
imperative, for the repetition of ceremonial acts or rites of passage — thus bringing 
the present world into line with the mythic past, providing appropriate psychological 
comfort to individuals making the journey between birth and death (Leach 1961: 125, 
Bloch & Parry 1982: 4). As a result, the uncertainties of biological duration and social 
reproduction are at least partly replaced by orderliness and predictability. 
 
If the ‘time of the event’ and ‘time of the structure’ are so closely intertwined within 
social discourse it would follow that accounts which exclusively emphasise one or the 
other effectively distance themselves from an understanding of temporality. A 
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particular problem is their inability to grasp dynamic change or transformation. As 
already mentioned, both individuals and groups are in fact ‘moving objects’ within 
social interaction since they possess the ability to creatively reconsider conventional 
norms and historically break, bend or alter them through action (Giddens 1979: 88, 
92, 267, 1984: 9, 14-6, Sahlins 1985: vii, Hodder 1987: 5). The ability to renegotiate 
is an important aspect of social discourse, even for those more traditional non-
Western societies, described in the previous paragraph, where important structural 
transformations are so often closely associated with the principle of event-based 
continuity. Yet by divorcing event and structure we lose the very diachronic 
relationships by which these transformations occur. The historical particularism of 
Barrett (1994) is a milestone in archaeological interpretation, but it all too easily 
resembles a prehistory of synchronic moments, or ‘here-and-nows’, whereby 
structural traditions do not always reach out across space and time. This is 
understandable given the theoretical priorities of the publication, but it is nonetheless 
difficult to grasp the historical conditions that may have developed or accumulated 
over the centuries, whilst any notion of structural transformation or movement is lost 
amongst the ‘snapshots’ of abstracted synchronies. The elimination of temporality is 
more evident with Hodder’s (1990) emphasis upon long-term structural continuity. He 
makes significant generalisations about what is taken to be a stable social order by 
excluding the effects of temporality. What is postulated is again a synchronic moment, 
albeit at a very much extended timescale. But this framework is antithetical to the 
diachronic process which inevitably results from human creativity, awareness and 
purposeful action, arguing that it is possible to take a slice through time and separate 
the static essence of any system from its social dynamic. 
 
These approaches to archaeological interpretation may partly reflect the traditional 
tendency within anthropology — a discipline which has recently exercised an 
unparalleled influence upon prehistorians — to deny the historic dynamic of social 
entities by concentrating on either the ‘time span of contemporary observation’ or 
those generalised structural principles which ‘transcend the particular circumstances 
of time and place’ (Bailey 1983: 171, see also Smith 1992: 24). By contrast, other 
archaeologists have over the last two decades turned to history for inspiration in 
creating an interpretive framework which appreciates the complex dialectic between 
event and structure (Gledhill and Rowlands 1982, Hodder 1987, Lewthwaite 1987, 
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Knapp 1992, Bintliff 1991, 1999, 2004). While not always explicitly stated, these 
contributions effectively claim that the alternative to the interpretive polarisation 
noted above is a nested scheme of timescales which accommodates both viewpoints. 
Such ‘time perspectivism’, as originally defined by the French historian Fernand 
Braudel and the Annales School, distinguishes between different layers or rhythms of 
the temporal continuum, of which the most influential was the Braudelian separation 
of the slowly changing longue durée of geographical time, the medium-term 
conjonctures of structural history, and the rapidly changing événements or the history 
of events (for excellent reviews see Clark 1985, Burke 1990, Bintliff 1991, Knapp 
1992). This is an approach with a distinctive framework of understanding and the 
wider impact of time perspectivism within the humanities is illustrated by the 
development of similar if more elaborate schemes by scholars such as Althusser 
(Althusser & Balibar 1970, ch.4), Ricoeur (1984, 1985, 1988) and Ingold (1986: 168-
9). But does this approach, which has been described as a ‘landmark with 
inexhaustible potential’ (Bintliff 1991: 8), actually possess the sophistication to 
conceptualise the complex dialectic of event and structure? 
 
 
SOCIAL TIME AND BRAUDELIAN HISTORY 
The seemingly all-embracing framework of Braudel’s time perspectivism, in which 
temporality is broken down into distinctive scales of analysis, is certainly seductive. 
As an approach it appears well suited to taming the practical consequences of the 
past’s extended chronological duration, and the ‘traditions handed on by successions 
of human societies over long periods of time’ (Clark 1994: 43). Because the 
reproduction of social life is seen to consist of intersecting planes of temporality there 
is the potential to neatly define, and then analytically limit, the apparently endless 
interplay of event and structure responsible for the development of society. The past 
of any specific era or region can therefore be considered by dividing it into its 
constitutive temporal rhythms. While these operate contemporaneously, or are always 
in contact with one another, they each create a different kind of history so that the 
larger-scale structural processes cannot be totally reduced to small-scale action, and 
similarly, the small-scale events are not completely determined by the larger-scale 
process (Fletcher 1992: 37). The emphasis, in other words, is on the differences 
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between timescales and it follows that each can be studied in distinctive ways so as to 
achieve forms of historical understanding appropriate to the specific variables and 
relationships that focus at each scale (Bintliff 1991: 6-10). The result is an analytical 
neatness whereby interpretation, and its definitions of temporality, proceeds according 
to a logic of scale, seemingly avoiding the reductionism or determinism of approaches 
which consider either the event or the structure as exclusively significant. Moreover, 
the process of transformation or ‘system-change’, surely what must be one of the most 
challenging aspects of archaeological interpretation, can accordingly be understood by 
employing a formulaic framework of either hierarchical causation or mutual feedback 
between the different temporal cycles (Bintliff 1991: 10-11). 
 
If this approach is seen by some as a panacea for the alternative of over-simplifying 
temporality, then a number of writers also believe it possesses the ability to bring 
together what are opposing theoretical paradigms within archaeology. It was argued, 
in a review of the Annales School and its application to archaeology, that time 
perspectivism works ‘precisely through its explicit combination of experienced life 
and externally analysed life’ (Bintliff 1991: 4). This is a direct reference to the 
contrasting attitudes of post-processual and processual archaeology which so 
dominated archaeological thought, in at least the English-speaking world, during the 
late 1980s. It was proposed that the Braudelian methodology, which considers both 
long-term systems and the real world of the individual participant, could reconcile 
these strikingly different viewpoints on the past (Bintliff 1991: 26). The same 
observation was made by a North American prehistorian in a later contribution to the 
same volume, and it is worth quoting his informative comments at length: 
 
‘The great strength of the Annales school, at least as broadly construed, is in 
its quest to reconcile the paradigmatic (logico-scientific) within the narrative 
in the study of the past, without either reducing the one to the other or 
succumbing to unproductive and uncritical relativism and formless scepticism. 
Coherence, consistency, and lack of contradiction, as well as logical adequacy, 
are the measures that are used to judge historical concepts and constructs; 
these constructs, in turn, are assayed against the historical ‘record’ as tests of 
their validity and opportunities for their falsification. Again, Annaliste goals 
might be said to comprise both knowledge (for which truth claims can be 
made) and understanding (which, at least in part, includes lifelikeness), which 
itself may later be cast in paradigmatic, logico-scientific terms.’ (Peebles 
1991: 111) 
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It is perhaps an irony that an approach which analytically distinguishes between life as 
‘lived’ and life as ‘ideal’, ‘ideological’ or ‘symbolic’ is seen as a suitable framework 
for such a theoretical rapprochement. Nevertheless, if such contentions are to be 
accepted then part of the reason for this apparent strength must lie with the 
observation that while the Annales School is accepted as a paradigm it deliberately 
lacks any theoretically explicit models (Althusser & Balibar 1970: 96, Furet 1983: 
390-1, Bintliff 1991: 27, Bulliet 1992: 132, Fletcher 1992: 38-9, Sherratt 1992: 137). 
Its supporters claim it is best characterised by an absence of dogmatism (Peebles 
1991: 111), although Braudel’s often stated view that the individual is ‘imprisoned 
within a destiny in which he himself has little hand’, or that ‘the long run always wins 
in the end’ (Braudel 1972: 1244, see also Kinser 1981: 65-6, Clark 1985: 183-6, 
Burke 1990: 34-5), suggests the existence of some very distinctive ‘rules’ about 
human agency. It is because the approach is seen to be without a coherent and 
theoretically conceptualised body of thought about human society that it is claimed it 
can bridge the divide between processual and post-processual archaeology. 
 
But what some consider a positive attribute can also be regarded as a fundamental 
weakness that unravels the logic of Braudelian history. The absence of a coherent and 
theoretically conceptualised body of thought is perhaps most apparent with its failure 
to adequately theorise how temporality is perceived or experienced by people. As 
already noted, the imposed scales of time are considered by the approach’s advocates 
to be without any absolute value, as abstractions which relate to the concern of the 
researcher rather than the temporal rhythms implicit to the society in question. Yet 
this is a curious standpoint. While these scales would all be incorporated together as 
part of the forward-running linearity of experiential or cognitive time — what 
Durkheim (1965: 441) described as the undifferentiated flow of ‘duration which I feel 
passing within me’ — they would only become meaningful to society when 
represented as ideological time, by which is meant the particular images that specific 
communities develop about real-world temporality: 
 
‘Cognitive time is universal perceptual time. Ideologies, on the other hand, are 
ideas which are presented in contexts in which authority is being imposed in 
some way, usually in the course of ritual events such as initiation ceremonies, 
the installation of sacred rulers, the celebration of ancestors, and so on.’ (Gell 
1992, 79) 
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This is an important distinction, for these ideological concepts of time — such as the 
‘cyclical duration’ and generational cycles observed by anthropologists amongst many 
societies (Barnes 1974, Howe 1981, Gell 1992: 16-7, ch. 4, Dietler & Herbich 1993: 
252-4) — are the means by which temporality is routinely structured as part of any 
social reality. What, then, is the point of imposing the analytical scales of time 
perspectivism without first assessing whether they may have actually existed as 
recognisable categories to the societies in question, especially since preliterate non-
Western communities clearly possess very different conceptions of ideological time? 
This is not to argue that past societies lacked an appreciation of the different times of 
the event, the individual lifetime or the longer-lasting institution: but rather, to 
emphasise that what is important are the specific means by which these concepts were 
articulated together within any particular social reality. 
 
These schemes, therefore, detach temporality from the very social context in which 
event and structure acquire their specific meaning. While the pragmatic approach of 
those who follow Braudel is certainly understandable, it should be emphasised that by 
creating these temporal layers in the first place the researcher is forced to deal with 
them on terms which could be inappropriate and misleading. Indeed, the problems 
associated with the imposition of such artificially fixed temporal categories may 
account for the often quoted failure of Braudelian history to explore the interplay 
between the longue durée, conjoncture and événement (Hexter 1972: 533, Kinser 
1981, 89, Boyd & Richerson 1985: 290, Fletcher 1992: 7, Knapp 1992: 1, Gosden 
1994: 134-5) — for how can the articulation of these different time-scales be 
discussed when the very cycles fail to reference the collective or ideological 
representations of cognitive time by which societies created their own temporality? 
The problems of grafting such a methodological code on to the rhythm of social life 
was realised by Braudel himself, even if he failed to address the root of the dilemma. 
Despite his best efforts in The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the 
Age of Phillip II, he was forced to conclude that ‘History becomes many stranded 
once more, bewilderingly complex and, who knows, in seeking to grasp all the 
different vibrations, waves of past time which ought ideally to accumulate like the 
divisions in the mechanism of a watch — the seconds, minutes, hours and days — 
perhaps we shall find the whole fabric slipping between our fingers’ (Braudel 1972: 
893). If this highlights the lack of a satisfactory ‘fit’ between his different levels of 
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history, then the problems are exaggerated for the archaeologist, given that the longue 
durée can truly be chronologically lengthy, while conjoncture and événement often 
appear inseparable in the archaeological record. 
 
The adherents of this approach also misunderstand the very character of cognitive or 
real-world time. Fundamental to this misconception is the assumption that the latter 
meaningfully exists within the concepts of event, structure, or indeed, any other scales 
of analysis. This is evident if the logic of Braudel’s history is followed through. It has 
been noted how the imposed scales of temporality are seen to represent no more than 
convenient methodological divisions along a continuum rather than fundamentally 
different phenomena. Yet the apparent simplicity of this viewpoint is surely deceptive, 
for by considering these scales as analytically distinct means that in practice they 
assume a purposeful existence. If not, then how could their implied independence 
actually be justified? The short-term of the event, the medium-term of structural 
history, and the long-term of geographical time are accordingly equated to 
perceptually different processes or levels of social reality which, by definition, are 
associated with distinct types or grades of temporality, each possessing either a slower 
or faster rate of directional time. Time moving at different speeds was fully accepted 
by Braudel himself (Kinser 1981: 65-72, 99, Burke 1990, 39), with the geographical 
tempo of the longue durée ‘representing a long-lasting rhythmical structure out of 
which derive the quicker pulses of cyclical history and the rapid episodes of everyday 
life’ (Gosden 1994: 134). But this is nonsensical, for in reality there is only one form 
of cognitive time, and that is the lived ‘present’ within which individuals experience 
directional real-world temporality as both memories of the past and as future 
anticipations. It is this which enfolds ‘the subject in a cocoon of implicitly accepted 
truths about the world, because it unites the past, the actuality and the becoming of the 
world in a seamless texture of interconnected experiences, a flux which carries the 
subject along with it’ (Gell 1992: 289, see also Ingold 1993: 159). Hence, concepts 
such as ‘event’ and ‘structure’ do not possess their own sense of time for they are 
fused together in a complex network of mnemonic and anticipatory relations played-
out within present-day existence. The distinctions between these concepts are not 
therefore intrinsic to the passage of time, and as such, the categories upon which time 
perspectivism relies are surely unhelpful. 
 
 11 
It is important to appreciate what is meant by ‘present-day existence’. It should 
certainly not be confused with the ‘here-and-now’ for the present-day ‘has its own 
thickness and temporal spread’ (Gell 1992: 223), as illustrated by Husserl (1966) in 
his highly influential phenomenological writings on psychological time-
consciousness. Noting how ‘now’ moments only become meaningful when conjoined 
with other ‘now’ moments, he distinguishes between ‘retention’, or a consciousness of 
the past which can either be reproduced or distorted in the present, and ‘protention’, or 
the anticipation of experience in a fantasied future present: 
 
‘We thus perceive the present not as a knife-edge ‘now’ but as a temporally 
extended field within which trends emerge out of the patterns we discern in the 
successive updatings of perceptual beliefs relating to the proximate past, the 
next most proximate past, and the next, and so on. This trends (sic) is 
projected into the future in the form of protentions, ie. anticipations of the 
pattern of updating of current perceptual beliefs which will be necessitated in 
the proximate future, the next most proximate future, and the next, in a manner 
symmetric with the past, but in inverse temporal order.’ (Gell 1992: 225) 
 
Hence, the awareness of the passage of cognitive time is not so much by way of a 
repetitive sequence of ‘here-and-nows’ as by a single extended present constantly 
sliding forward. Put another way, real-world time resides ‘between events that are 
happening now, have taken place in the past, or might possibly occur in the future’ 
(Adam 1990: 21): and because any present is being constantly created, existing only 
in a state of ceaseless ‘becoming’, temporality itself takes the form of coexisting 
memories and anticipations (Adam 1990: 24-34). This, then, is how cognitive time is 
internalised by individuals, and, as such, is a reality in which event and structure can 
be no more than analytical abstractions — inventions of academia for reasons of 
categorisation (Althusser & Balibar 1970: 96, Sahlins 1985: 26-7, Thomas 1996: 35) 
— for what is a more complex process. 
 
My comments demonstrate that Braudel’s time perspectivism is more concerned with 
being historical than being temporal. Its starting-point is not a theoretically-informed 
understanding of how time becomes bound into any social system, as the categories 
which enable the writing of a ‘total history’. But is this a contrast which actually 
matters? Should archaeologists not simply accept that they have a unique perspective 
upon the past and are therefore fully justified in privileging such analytical scales, 
especially if past peoples were themselves aware of being enmeshed in temporal 
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narratives extending beyond their own lifecycles (as illustrated, for example, by 
Bradley 2002, Gosden & Lock 1998 or Olivier 1999)? I believe not, for by accepting 
such a viewpoint we misunderstand a fundamental concern, notably the manner by 
which social systems reproduce and transform themselves. As already argued, implicit 
to Braudel’s Annaliste history is the belief that event and structure possess their own 
rhythms of cognitive temporality, and that real-time can only be understood within a 
hierarchical model of causality whereby events are nothing more than synchronic 
‘surface ripples or disturbances on the mass of long-term development below’ 
(Braudel 1972: 22, see also Knapp 1992: 6). It can, of course, be argued that this 
repudiation of the short-term is not necessarily intrinsic to the approach and can be 
avoided when ‘verbal messages, actions, and material signals are viewed as a 
hierarchy of independent, interacting message systems’, each of which has its 
‘individual signal rate and a differing degree of inherent inertia’ (see Fletcher 1992: 
46-7). Yet this is to see structure and historical process as actually existing outside of 
agency. This is a mode of interpretation, based as it is on a series of abstract 
categories and inter-relationships, which does not recognise that social reproduction is 
grounded in the performativity of a group’s members — that the generation of all 
shared social meaning actually depends upon the recurrence of similar phenomena, or 
events whose cultural ‘sameness’ is recognised, and this only occurs because of 
actions and individual recollections which together invoke a continuity with the past 
and a dynamic for the forward-projection of such meaning (Connerton 1989). It also 
fails to recognise that by disentangling structure from present-day discourse, and thus 
also from chance, uniqueness and unpredictability, you create narratives or stories 
which can only ‘go’ in certain logical ways. The reproduction and transformation of 
any social system is reduced, as a result, to an exercise in predictive modelling. 
 
It could of course be argued that past societies, like the ‘cold’ societies of Levi-
Strauss’s writings, remained fairly stable or constant, their only perception of 
temporality equivalent to the lifecycle of persons or groups as they pass through the 
unchanging structure. As already noted, acts of ritual could be used to invoke the 
perception that ‘everything passes, but everything remains the same’ (Gell 1992: 343), 
thus actually cancelling out the need to study ‘present-day existence’. The logic of this 
argument is clearly observable in many accounts of prehistoric society, especially 
those that create structural histories for various slices of the Neolithic and early 
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Bronze Age (eg. Renfrew 1973, Shennan 1982, Thorpe & Richards 1984). While I 
would certainly not contend that societies are incapable of possessing such idealised 
concepts of timelessness, or deny that ritual can indeed be seen as a machine for the 
abolition of time, it should be remembered that real-world time ‘happens’ regardless 
of whether a society believes or not in its own ahistorical constitution. For the latter is 
no more than an ideological representation of cognitive temporality, and as such, is 
only meaningfully incorporated into strategies of social reproduction as part of 
present-day existence. Therefore, timelessness is not a result of some abstract notion 
of collective remembrance — as ‘structure’ autonomously gives rise to ‘events’ which 
in turn submerge back into the grand historical narrative — but is dependent upon a 
specific network of reciprocal relationships as retention and protention, or memory 
and anticipation, combine within any temporally extended present. And since the 
retention of current consciousness is always subject to distortion, diminution or even 
complete ‘system-change’ as it is projected into the future as protentions, society 
possesses the ability to transform itself (Sahlins 1985: vii, Gell 1992: 224). This is to 
acknowledge ‘the potential import and meaningfulness of our individual lives, the 
promise that our personal actions and struggles can budge (or even redirect) the 
apparent indifference and inertia of external reality’ (Gould 1999: ix). In this way, no 
present is the same, regardless of a society’s belief in its own timelessness. 
 
 
L’HISTOIRE PROBLÈME AND GENEALOGY 
While the time perspectivism of Fernand Braudel has found a small number of eager 
champions within archaeology some have also embraced one of the most influential of 
the third generation of Annaliste scholars, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (Bintliff 1991, 
14-5, 1999, 2004, Knapp 1992, 85). He played an important role in developing 
l’histoire-problème, an approach initially pioneered by Febvre, one of the founding 
fathers of the Annales School, which aimed to grasp the process by which particular 
social structures emerged by working backwards in time through the detailed political 
and economic evidence, and identifying those ‘traumatic events’ or ‘creative events’ 
which acted as a catalyst for their development (Le Roy Ladurie 1972: 115). Given 
this preoccupation with social structure, or what Le Roy Ladurie (1981: 4) himself 
described as ‘the layers of rock beneath our feet’, it may be thought that here we have 
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an approach which is well-suited to the aspirations of many archaeologists. Moreover, 
a stated aim was to drill through these layers of rock, to deal with ‘the activities, the 
struggles, and the thoughts of the people themselves’ (Le Roy Ladurie 1974: 8), 
accordingly restoring ‘the event, however unique, to its proper place within a kind of 
history which is nevertheless committed to being systematic’ (Le Roy Ladurie 1979: 
116). It may be the case that, as with Braudel’s time perspectivism, there is a marked 
discrepancy between the stated goals and what was actually achieved (Clark 1985: 
186, Burke 1990, 83), yet his work does, in principle, focus upon present-day 
existence and understand it as an instrument for social innovation, modification or 
stability. At the same time, events are unfurled in time in an attempt to uncover the 
biography of chronologically enduring social patterns or structures. This, then, could 
be an informative perspective for it alludes to those important relationships, discussed 
above, between things past, present and future. It not only assumes that a central 
problem of interpretation is how a social system became ‘stretched’ across wide spans 
of space and time, but argues that this can only be appreciated by pursuing 
connections between a lived present and its practical realisation through time. 
 
The approach is based on interactive causality. By considering events as ‘intersections 
that break patterns, and as such are central to understanding and explaining change’ 
(Knapp 1992: 6), the short-term is credited with the ability to interact and affect 
historical process. However, if this represents a commendable retreat from the 
determinism of hierarchical causation, whereby the long-term determined all at a 
lower level of existence, it did not detract from the belief that ‘total history’ was 
achievable: that by adopting different scales of temporality it is possible to reconstruct 
the whole physical, intellectual and moral universe of distinctive periods of history. 
Hence, of continuing importance was the time perspectivism of earlier approaches, the 
assumption that different types of cognitive temporality — principally the short-term 
of l’histoire événementielle and the long-term of structural history — could be 
differentiated from one another, studied separately, and then rejoined to form a 
‘structure-event-structure’ model of causation. But paradoxically, if the distinction 
between event and structure is in fact logically unwarranted — and I have already 
argued that these concepts are analytically inseparable, lacking explanatory potency as 
independent terms — then the writings of Le Roy Ladurie and other third generation 
Annaliste historians hint at this. The long-term of these accounts reads, at times, 
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suspiciously like a chain of events upon which the historian has simply imposed a 
shared theme, or what is then described as the ‘structure’. The social distinctions 
which are the cornerstone of ‘The case of the Chouan Uprising’ (Le Roy Ladurie 
1979), for example, are clearly only manifest through the occurrence and reoccurrence 
of events, whose meanings were widely recognised by the communities that populate 
the study — in this case, they include practical experiences of land tenure, 
electioneering, acts of voting, or just the verbal discourse, or airing of grievances, 
which are an influential part of daily life. In this text, in other words, there is a sense 
in which ‘structure’ and ‘event’ are inseparable parts of a constantly sliding forward 
present. And if there is no distinction between ‘event’ and ‘structure’, there can be no 
interactive causality between these concepts, and if the latter does not exist, how is it 
possible to achieve ‘total history’? Without models of causality it is impossible to 
weave the endless interplay of events into a meaningful and coherent narrative. 
Indeed, without a belief in structural history how can analysis establish its own point 
of departure and that very necessary finishing-line? 
 
These problems can be overcome if it is accepted that an understanding of how social 
systems are ‘stretched’ across wide spans of space and time will not be achieved by 
some grand narrative, but through writing what has recently been described as 
genealogies, or histories of the individual entities which constitute a social system 
(Gosden 1994: 140, Thomas 1996: 38-9, 96). Genealogies would, like l’histoire-
problème itself, trace the descent of particular institutions, practices and material 
culture through the network of social realities, or lived presents, within which they 
were created, reproduced and transformed. But unlike these later Annaliste histories, 
their ‘descent’ would not be understood within a framework of causality, whereby a 
dialectical, but ultimately abstract, interplay between event and structure is simply 
assumed to have existed: rather, it will be asked what generative rules and resources 
were actually responsible for the ‘flow’ of continuous conduct. This is to conceive the 
past as chains of ordered presents along which the complex network of mnemonic and 
anticipatory relations are played-out as part of specific social practices. The individual 
links of these chains ultimately derive from our chronological, or at least sequential, 
understanding of the archaeological record, with its particular contexts, layers and 
horizons often equating to individual action. But because these occurrences would, in 
reality, be conscious manifestations of both memory and anticipation, they also 
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possess their own ‘thickness’ or temporal spread. When these ‘presents’ are placed in 
their sequential order it may be possible to connect together the mnemonic and 
anticipatory relations of individual acts, and subsequently, create a ‘timeline’ and 
social biography. It may even be possible to chart this back to an event, or tear in 
history, which acted as a catalyst for particular developments. This, then, is to accept 
the eventfulness of the archaeological record, but unlike the knife-edge ‘here-and-
now’ noted above, it adopts a more temporally extended enquiry, examining those 
interconnections or relationships spread out between specific ‘now’ moments and into 
the social memory of successive generations. Hence, it embraces an awareness that 
real-time is the very agent which provides social strategies with their context, 
meaning, and historical potency. 
 
This accepts that interpretation should be problem-orientated, focusing on particular 
questions about the origin, reproduction and transformation of individual institutions, 
practices and material culture. Implications follow, of which the most obvious is the 
simple fact that, as a result, ‘only a part of the vast dark world’, which is the past, 
‘“lights up” before us at any given time’ (Thomas 1996: 96). If this implies that the 
past must be multi-stranded, it also means that many of these strands would no doubt 
compete with each other, or even be contradictory: for as Gosden (1994: 140) notes, 
whilst drawing the obvious comparison with family history, ‘Family members start 
with certain assumptions about which people to include in the tree…..If different 
starting assumptions were used, other genealogies could be constructed’. Similarly, 
the archaeological project could result in interpretive heterogeneity or historical 
plurality, and if this appears to represent an alarming retreat from holism, then it 
should be considered as an agenda which does no more than accept that past societies, 
just like their present-day counterparts, were not a ‘perfectly woven and all-
enmeshing web’ (Archer 1988, 2). For, in essence, the ‘starting assumptions’ of its 
actors would have also been different, varying according to their exact spatial and 
temporal placement or position within any social system. Indeed, this reality accounts 
for the mistaken belief, by those who invoke time perspectivism, that ‘structure’ must 
exist outside agency, because if it did not, how would one explain the fact that ‘In the 
practice of the lived moment all the abstractions and constraints and systems cannot 
possibly be present except in the simplest of terms and most provisional of ways’ 
(Hodder 1999: 131)? But, of course, these ‘abstractions and constraints and systems’ 
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are rarely, if ever, present all at once, for if they were there would be little 
unpredictability in social reproduction. Therefore, to create ‘competing’ genealogies 
is simply to realise that ‘structure’ — so long regarded as the synchronic principles 
which generate social life — has no reality outside present-day existence, and because 
none of these presents are the same, social reproduction itself possesses no historical 
fixity. In this way, there is no such thing as a ‘stable’ society, or indeed, no conceptual 
opposition between synchronic and diachronic temporality, because any system, as it 
unfolds through time, will not only be reproduced, but also constantly distorted or 
modified, endlessly producing novel terms of understanding for those experiencing 
each new moment of existence. 
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